

## ABSTRACTS

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**Artificial intelligence in the service of parliaments: developing good practices and lessons learned from them**

The central topic of my study is the mapping of the existing models in different countries regarding the role of artificial intelligence in parliament, from Bahrain to Italy, from Estonia to Argentina, and based on this, determining in which areas of parliamentary work we can introduce artificial intelligence-based technologies with the least risk. and what skills artificial intelligence will need to play a greater role in parliamentary work than it currently does.

The EU's artificial intelligence regulation classifies as high-risk only those artificial intelligence-based applications related to democratic processes that directly aim to influence voter behavior or to shape the final result of a vote, so in my opinion, technologies that facilitate the internal functioning of the legislature do not fall within this scope. It follows from this that, although the European legislation generally perceived the risks affecting democracy and reflected on them, it still left a relatively wide scope for the development of artificial intelligence-based software that could possibly make the everyday activities of parliaments smoother.

At the same time, the Hungarian Artificial Intelligence Strategy does not mention these algorithms in any form, however, recognizing their importance, the Office of the Hungarian Parliament organized a large-scale conference in September 2023 on the possibilities inherent in the parliamentary integration of artificial intelligence. At the moment, we only have fragmentary and rough information about what changes artificial intelligence, which has already been used in parliaments in different parts of the world, has brought, and it would be important to conduct a more in-depth investigation in this direction as well. In my study, I make an attempt to mitigate these deficiencies, since parliamentary work cannot remain insensitive to the ever-accelerating pace of technological development in the longer term, in Hungary or elsewhere.

After laying down the starting points, the next step could be to examine what kind of strategic thinking is needed on behalf of the staffs of the national parliaments in Hungary, but also elsewhere, in order to develop their attitudes towards artificial intelligence.

**Keywords:** Parliamentary law; artificial intelligence; text recognition; chatbot; democratic innovations

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**The relationship between the parliament and the ministries in Germany**

This study examines the relationship between the German parliament (Bundestag) and federal ministries from organizational, oversight, and legislative perspectives. Germany operates as a parliamentary federal republic, where the interaction and balance of power between the legislative and executive branches are crucial. The Bundestag's oversight functions—such as committees, inquiry committees, and the parliamentary questioning system—ensure transparency and accountability of ministries. Parliamentary state secretaries play a key role in communication between ministries and parliament, although their responsibilities and political significance have evolved over time. The study analyzes the legislative process, in which the government plays a dominant role, while parliamentary participation remains relatively limited. The Constitutional Court's interpretations contribute to maintaining the balance of power, particularly regarding the government's duty to inform parliament and the Bundestag's oversight rights. The analysis highlights that while the German parliamentary system fosters a close and dynamic relationship between the government and the legislature, executive influence remains strong in the legislative process.

**Keywords:** Bundestag, ministry, parliamentary oversight, parliamentary state secretary, legislation

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**Arguments to justify the political responsibility of the President of the Republic**

When dealing with the responsibility of the head of state, it is often said that the President of a Republic in a parliamentary system is only legally, but not politically responsible. The form of government of Hungary is republic and operates under a parliamentary system. Thus, in our country, it is generally accepted that the head of state has no political responsibility. This is explained by the powers of the President of the Republic, which fall into two categories: There are powers which may be exercised with or without the counter-signature of a member of the Government, and the counter-signature is the act of taking political responsibility from the head of state.

The hypothesis of my study is that the President of the Republic of parliamentary systems – in this case the head of state of Hungary – also has political responsibility, which I try to support with several arguments. To do this, however, we must start from the role of the President of the Republic in the constitutional system. We must point out that the head of state is not neutral from the political process and institutions, so he or she also has a political function to some extent. Then we turn to a detailed analysis of the Hungarian constitutional system. We present the practice of the Constitutional Court on the political responsibility of the head of state, which is the first step in the verification of the hypothesis. After that we examine the institution of resignation. We present the practice after the change of regime and interpret resignation as a “self-declaration” of political responsibility, which we compare with legal responsibility. Finally, we analyze the constitutional aspects of the recent grant individual pardon case, which also confirms the existence of political responsibility of the President of the Republic. The grant individual pardon used to be a power that could be exercised with a counter-signature, but after the outbreak of the case, the constitutional legislator transferred it to a power that could be exercised without a counter-signature.

Summing up the above arguments, we can conclude that the President of the Republic also has political responsibility, even if its interpretation differs from the political responsibility of the executive power of parliamentary systems.

**Keywords:** president of the republic, political responsibility, parliamentary system

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**Stabilizer or blocking force? – Regulation of the confidence issue, with special regard to the constructive motion of no confidence**

Regarding the government's responsibility to the parliament, the question of confidence is of particular importance. The legislative body's confidence in the government is a key issue both as a measure of parliamentarism and in terms of the existence of governability. The government crisis in Germany repeatedly draws attention to the constitutional institutions designed to manage the parliament's confidence in the government. In addition to drawing conclusions from constitutional law, the study tries to justify the legislator's intention that the institution of the constructive motion of no confidence is a suitable tool for quickly ending government crises by explaining the political-science connections. In this context, the question arises as to whether the constructive no-confidence motion exerts its effect as a stabilizing or blocking force. In order to draw a conclusion, it is necessary to analyze and evaluate the possible constitutional forms of the vote of confidence and the motion of no confidence. The cases suitable for drawing conclusions are primarily focused on the presentation of German and domestic examples.

The constructive form of the motion of no confidence served primarily as a model for the states of Central and Eastern Europe during the regime change period of the nineties. For the nascent democracies of the region, the seemingly stabilizing effect of the legal institution may have proved to be a motive that probably convinced those involved in the constitution-making process to adopt the German model.

In the event of a crisis of confidence, strong party and factional discipline is necessary to maintain confidence in the government. The so-called interregnum period, as well as a lengthy and costly election process, contribute to the escalation of the crisis. The undoubted advantage of a constructive no-confidence motion is that it guarantees an immediate and effective solution to replace the prime minister who has lost the confidence of the parliament.

However, the stabilization is only apparent in some cases. Based on the foreign examples, it is not possible to take a clear position on the issue of whether the legal institution has a stabilizing effect on the government or a blocking effect on the opposition, but the German and Hungarian examples studied in more detail prove the phenomenon of the blocking effect.

**Keywords:** constructive motion of no confidence, vote of confidence, government crisis, government stability, parliamentarism

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**The rise of the extreme right-wing pole in the Netherlands. Consequences and challenges of early parliamentary elections in 2023**

The victory of Geert Wilders' Party for Freedom (PVV) in the parliamentary elections on 22 November 2023 was a major challenge for the political parties that play a dominant role in the Dutch model of consociational democracy. The PVV has been in opposition politics since its formation in 2006. As an external supporter of the Mark Rutte government formed in 2010, it did not get a seat in the three-party coalition, but the withdrawal of its support provoked a government crisis. The party, which performed relatively poorly in the 2012 elections, was able to respond to current domestic problems in the Netherlands, such as immigration, the growing Islamic population and multiculturalism, by increasing its support, especially among provincial voters. The rise of the PVV shows that the Dutch party system, which was based on the four major ideological pillars after World War II and ensured stable consensus between the political elite of parties by creating coalitions, is not possible in recent political environment.

While the large number of parties is a constant feature of Dutch domestic politics, factors have emerged on both sides of the political table that are characterised by increasing political tensions rather than cooperation. This phenomenon is due to the fact that new right-wing and new left-wing parties that emerged after the turn of the millennium were formed from the former parties, partly because they wanted to represent a particular sub-area (e.g. animal protection [PvdD]) or the interests of a particular social group (the agricultural sector (BBB/ or pensioners [50PLUS]). Although the new, smaller parties did not become a governmental factor in 2021 or 2023, with the sole exception of the NSC, they are capable of dividing the centre-right and centre-left voter base of traditional parties such as the VVD or the PvdA, thus threatening the coalition-building and the possibility of cooperation between the different political camps. Behind the changes in the party system, there have also been major shifts in Dutch society in the decades since World War II. The former ideological pillars are no longer functioning, and voters' motivations are much more influenced by the two most important issues – what Dutch society will be like, how far the inclusion of social groups with different cultural and religious identities will be allowed, and what role the Netherlands is expected to play in European politics.

**Keywords:** extreme right, parliamentary elections, “Wilders phenomenon”, consociational democracy, government crisis

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